Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21: Written Evidence: Dr Kyriakos N Kotsoglou, Senior Lecturer in Law (Criminal Evidence), Northumbria University and Marion Oswald, Vice Chancellor's Senior Fellow in Law, Northumbria University (CTSB01) by Kotsoglou, Kyriakos & Oswald, Marion
  
 
 
 
 
1 
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 (the Bill) 
Written evidence to the House of Commons Public Bill Committee 
 
Submitted by Dr Kyriakos N. Kotsoglou, Senior Lecturer in Law (Criminal Evidence), 
Northumbria University (Corresponding Author: kyriakos.kotsoglou@northumbria.ac.uk), and 
Marion Oswald, Vice Chancellor’s Senior Fellow in Law, Northumbria University 
(marion.oswald@northumbria.ac.uk) 
 
 
The Proposed Polygraph Measure in the Bill 
 
Executive Summary 
1. We caution against the introduction of the proposed polygraph measure as set out in 
clause 41 of the Bill. The U.K. should not base its deterrent strategies on pseudoscientific methods 
which raise considerable rule of law concerns. 
2. The use of the polygraph raises serious methodological and conceptual issues: lack 
of validity, lack of consistency, and the necessity to use deception and psychological manipulation in 
order to convince the subject that the polygraph works. The polygraph test is not a neutral truth-
conducive device –it does not detect anything. It is an oppressive interrogation tool. 
3. The utility of the polygraph consists in the bogus pipeline effect and interrogative 
suggestibility. The subject operates on the wrongful basis that the polygraph test a) works 
independently and b) will reflect his/her true attitude. Because the subject does not wish to be second-
guessed by the machine, he/she will feel pressured to disclose adverse statements. 
4. The ‘accuracy rate of 89%’ (see Home Office, Factsheet) refers to laboratory settings 
which are wildly different from any practical context in the criminal justice system. 
5. The Bill’s ECHR Memoranda fails to address the serious Article 8 and Article 5 issues 
arising due to the lack of validity of the polygraph method. If the polygraph is introduced, the licence 
recall would by law need to be subject to independent oversight. 
7. Even from the viewpoint of its own logic the polygraph cannot deliver what the 
legislator intends: protection of the public. On the contrary, the polygraph leaves major security 
threats undetected. 
8. The use of unreliable methods in siloed parts of the criminal justice system (context of 
probation) fragments the unity of law. 
9. Our analysis based on data gathered through FOI requests confirms that there are 
significant structural inconsistencies in the way polygraph tests are conducted across England 
and Wales, suggesting an urgent need for a transparent and critical review of current practices 
before further polygraph measures are introduced. 
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Validity and deterrent effect 
1. Ever since the first deployment of the polygraph in the first quarter of the 20th century, criminal 
courts, scientific institutions, military organisations, and last but not least, academic discourse have 
continuously and almost unanimously discredited the polygraph as regards its validity in fact-finding 
processes. In every western legal order that we know of, polygraph evidence does not pass the 
admissibility test. To be more precise, the efforts to introduce the polygraph or other unscientific 
methods into the criminal process have, historically, shaped the criteria for the admissibility of expert 
evidence. The polygraph test is not a neutral truth-conducive device –it does not detect anything. On 
the contrary, it is an interrogation tool in which the extraction imperative is secreted under the veil of 
technology (Alder 2007; Kotsoglou 2020; Oswald 2020). 
2. It has been known for decades that the value of the polygraph is rather its deterrent effect than its 
truth-conducive character (Kotsoglou 2017; Lee 1952; Oswald 2020). The U.K. cannot afford to build 
its deterrent strategies on pseudoscientific methods which can easily be bypassed. The question is 
whether the reliability of methods, the rule against oppression and the rule of law are guiding principles 
for probation services. If so, then junk-science has no place in our legal system. 
 
Theoretical Underpinnings of the polygraph 
3. The central claim for the understanding of the polygraph – i.e. the presupposition that the polygraph 
indicates deception – is inextricably linked to an obsolete and abandoned paradigm in psychology 
(introspection). As every blue-ribbon committee on the validity of the polygraph reports, the ‘stress 
response’ to be measured can be triggered by a host of factors. There is simply no unique physiological 
indicator that reflects a single underlying process, let alone deception (NRC 2003). 
4. Polygraph operators face thus an unpalatable dilemma: Either to inform the subject that the polygraph 
test lacks scientific validity or to deploy a psychological procedure (stimulation test) based on false 
statements in order to extract a confession. The field of polygraphy choose persistently the latter – 
among other things through demonstrably false empirical claims. 
5. Our recent research based on FOI requests to police forces, the NPCC and the Ministry of Justice has 
uncovered reliance on this concept of utility to justify use of the polygraph, although claims continue 
to be made in guidance documentation that the polygraph can ‘detect lies’ (Kotsoglou/Oswald 2020). 
Furthermore, our FOI requests uncovered considerable inconsistency of approach and lack of 
transparency around the extent of usage, including at least one use of the polygraph outside of the sex 
offender context (Hertfordshire Police’s C2 programme). This raises considerable concerns around the 
‘creeping’ influence of the polygraph absent sufficient critique of its theoretical underpinnings, or 
robust and transparent oversight of its implications for individual rights. 
 
Bogus pipeline-effect and interrogative suggestibility 
6. The true purpose of the stimulation test is to make the subject believe in the infallibility of lie 
detection. This is where the so-called ‘bogus pipeline effect’ kicks in. Because the subject operates on 
the wrongful basis that the polygraph test a) works independently and b) will reflect his true attitude, 
and because he does not wish to be second-guessed by the machine, he will feel pressured to disclose 
adverse statements (Jones/Sigall 1971). Furthermore, interrogative suggestibility appears to be 
significantly mediated by anxiety processes. Note that the main function of the stim-test is to instil fear 
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of detection. In a similar way to torture, suggestibility is not a reliable or legitimate way of conducting 
an interview (Gudjonsson 2003;Kotsoglou 2017). 
 
Lack of Realism 
7. According to some literature, polygraph tests can discriminate lying from truth telling at rates well 
above chance, though well below perfection. However, empirical research in that area suffers from lack 
of realism. Tests are conducted a) in laboratory settings, b) in populations of examinees untrained in 
countermeasures. We cannot generalise these results to real-world settings. The reason for that is what 
psychologists coin the ‘base rate problem’. It is practically impossible to know the proportion of 
subjects undergoing polygraph tests who are genuinely lying or guilty of the offence of which they are 
accused. Therefore, we cannot estimate the frequency with which false confessions occur (Gudjonsson 
2003; Kotsoglou 2014). 
8. Admittedly, in certain laboratory settings lie-detection may provide results above chance. However, 
the accuracy rate of 89% (see Home Office, Factsheet) refers to laboratory settings where subjects of 
psychological research are instructed to imagine themselves committing a mock crime by stealing, say, 
something in the room. This should, so the aspiration, create an emotional potential with which one 
could conduct experiments. This is, however, an experiment with the wrong type of guinea pigs, for the 
forensic context is wildly dissimilar (Biedermann/Kotsoglou 2018). Real people involved in the 
criminal justice system have real stakes, complex motivations and recollections of events 
(Kotsoglou/Oswald 2020). 
 
Exerting Pressure 
9. The polygraph test puts the subject under unjustifiable pressure. According to the currently valid 
Operational Instructions,1 failure to attend or comply with the pseudo-scientific polygraph-test, is 
heavily sanctioned as it constitutes a breach of the licence condition. 
10. Furthermore, an offender who has ‘failed the test’, i.e. gets back ‘deception indicated’ (DI) as a 
result, will be asked to ‘explain the test result in the post-test phase of the examination’. This is another 
opportunity, the document states, for the released offender to disclose information.  
11. It is striking that the Operational Instructions do not regard –even from within the flawed logic of 
the polygraph— the possibility of a false-alarm as relevant. The offender has to provide an explanation 
for an indication which, we repeat, can be on the polygraph’s own terms, a false positive. Note that if 
deception is indicated and the offender is not ‘forthcoming in offering any explanation’, then a ‘sound 
guiding principle’ is to ‘address the issue “head on” with the offender and try to verify it’. It becomes 
thus clear that the polygraph test is not a neutral truth-conducive device –it does not detect anything. 
On the contrary, the polygraph is revealed as an interrogation tool, another Trojan horse in which the 
extraction imperative is secreted under the veil of technology (Kotsoglou 2017; Kotsoglou/Oswald 
2020). 
 
 
 
1 See NOMS - Polygraph Examinations: Instructions for Imposing Licence Conditions for the Polygraph on 
Sexual Offenders. Appendix 1, para 2.9.4. 
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Lack of Scrutiny and Individual Redress 
12. According to the current practice in England and Wales, a released (sex) offender whose licence 
was revoked can request an ‘oral hearing’ at the Ministry of Justice’s Public Protection Casework 
Section (PPCS). The Ministry of Justice’s ECHR Memoranda asserts that, if a terrorist offender is 
recalled to prison as a result of failing to cooperate with a test or from evidence adduced from 
information obtained from a test, there is no breach of Article 5 as detention is in accordance with a 
sentence set by a court. This analysis fails to address the lack of validity that goes to the very heart of 
the test itself, and the ‘black box’ nature of the process which militates against the individual’s ability 
to challenge (Oswald 2020). 
13. We would argue for the introduction of a process of independent scrutiny of the use of polygraph 
in licence recall decisions. 
 
Failure to protect the Public 
14. If the subject discloses information, probation officers using the polygraph will reach a fork in the 
path. Their two options are either to stick to the polygraph session, which results to the inadmissibility 
of any statement made by the released person in criminal proceedings, or to stop the polygraph session, 
caution the offender and repeat the question, in order to perform their responsibility of protecting the 
public. Even from the viewpoint of its own logic the polygraph cannot deliver what the legislator 
intended: protection of the public. On the contrary, it leaves, as the NRC (2003) report concluded, ‘too 
many major security threats undetected’. 
15. Polygraph tests may contribute to a false sense of security. For it has been shown that polygraph 
tests can easily be tricked (NRC 2003). 
 
Integrity of the Legal Order 
16. By deploying interview rituals masqueraded as technological solutions which on their own terms 
lack scientific validity, we jeopardise not only the rationality of a legal order, but, most importantly, its 
normative cohesion and integrity too. The use of unreliable methods in siloed parts of the criminal 
justice system (context of probation) fragments the unity of law. 
 
Information on Polygraph testing from FOI requests 
17. As regards the use of polygraph tests for released sex offenders in England and Wales, we have 
submitted FOI requests to all UK police forces, the NPCC and the Ministry of Justice. Our analysis 
based on data gathered through FOI requests confirms the point made inter alia by Mr Gavin Robinson 
MP during the parliamentary discussion: polygraph tests are not ‘safe or secure’. This is true regardless 
of their validity and reliability, for there are significant structural issues in the way polygraph tests 
are conducted across England and Wales.  
18. The interview rituals deployed are even among themselves uncoordinated and of varying 
professional standards. As the Ministry of Justice/Probation Service informed us: ‘there are no set 
questions that come with this [polygraph] test. Each test is created and based on the specific licence 
conditions of the individual.’ 
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19. The very term we use is therefore a misnomer, for what is often and rather uncritically referred to 
as the polygraph-test is actually a diverse set of malleable interview rituals. Proponents of the use of 
polygraphs choose to ignore the common-sense fact that communication with people and ascription of 
truthfulness are highly context-sensitive and thus antithetical to the general formulation which is a 
feature salient in science (FOI-data). 
20. More specifically: 
• A number of police forces informed us that each test is bespoke to the individual, which 
ultimately means that there is no standardised methodology for the polygraph test. 
• 18 police forces (36.8%) stated that they did not hold any information yet still used s.30 & 31 
FOI Act 2000 to ’Neither confirm nor deny’ whether additional information was held. 
• Only 5 police forces (10.8%) denied any use of polygraphs. These forces stated that they ‘do 
not’, ‘have never’, and ‘do not intend to’ use polygraph testing. 
 
--------------- 
Kyriakos N. Kotsoglou and Marion Oswald 
Northumbria University 
16 June 2020 
Newcastle upon Tyne 
U.K.  
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